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316 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2003)
I. Facts
On January 17, 1990, in Mecklenberg County, John Dennis Daniels
("Daniels") wrapped an electrical cord around his elderly aunt's neck and stran-
gled her. Daniels stole seventy to eighty dollars from his aunt's purse, purchased
some cocaine, and returned to his home which he shared with his wife and son.
Daniels smoked his cocaine in the bathroom. Afterward, he attacked his wife
with a hammer, then chased her down the hall and hit her in the head with a
kerosene heater. At this point, Daniels's son joined the struggle. Daniels re-
moved a rock from the family's aquarium and struck his son with it. He then
began striking his son in the head with the hammer. Daniels chased his wife and
son out into the yard and continued to strike his wife in the head with the
hammer. Shortly thereafter, the house caught on fire and the police arrived.'
When the police picked Daniels up, he directed them to his aunt's house.
The police discovered her strangled body with the cord still wrapped around her
neck. The police officer then took Daniels to the Law Enforcement Center.
Daniels requested pen and paper and wrote a letter to the Governor which stated
that he was not crazy and that his actions were premeditated. Shortly after
writing this letter, an investigator found Daniels with the drawstring from his
pants tied around his neck and a second string attached to a filing cabinet.
Following this incident, Daniels waived his Miranda rights and gave a confession
by the end of the night. Early the next morning, the defendant was committed
to Dorothea Dix Hospital for two weeks because he was suicidal.2
At trial, Daniels presented evidence that he had a pervasive personality
disorder and a history of drug and alcohol dependency which impaired his ability
to act with premeditation. His substance abuse aggravated his personality
disorder and resulted in an emotional and social state similar to that of an eleven
or twelve-year-old child. A clinical psychologist testified that the defendant's
ability to weigh the consequences of his behavior would have been reduced to
the point of being "inconsequential."3
Daniels was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. On direct
appeal, Daniels was denied relief. He then filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief
("MAR"), but it too was denied. Daniels filed a second MAR in 1995 and it was
1. Daniels v. Lee, 316 F.3d 477, 480-81 (4th Cir. 2003).
2. Id. at 481-82.
3. Id. at 483.
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dismissed. In 1996, the North Carolina legislature passed North Carolina
General Statutes Section 15A-1415(f) ("1415(f)") which provided that a capital
prisoner is entitled to the complete files of his case from all the agencies involved
in his prosecution. Based on 1415(f), Daniels filed a motion for discovery. The
State contended that because Daniels's second MAR had been filed and dis-
missed before 1996, 1415(f) did not entitle him to relief. While this issue was
being contested, Daniels sought federal habeas relief in district court. Eventually,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina determined that 1415(f) applied retroac-
tively. Daniels was then able to complete his request for discovery under the
statute. He filed an amended petition for federal habeas relief in 2001 and the
district court awarded summary judgment to the State. Daniels then sought a
certificate of appealability and a reversal of the Summary Judgment Order.4
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to issue
Daniels a certificate of appealability and dismissed his appeal.'
IlL. Analysis
The Fourth Circuit explained that in order for a certificate of appealability
to issue, the applicant must make a "substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right."6 The court then applied this standard to the five claims
Daniels raised in his petition for habeas relief.7 The court gave the most detailed
treatment to Daniels's Sixth Amendment claim.
Daniels claimed that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by
impinging upon his right to compulsory process and his right to self-representa-
tion.8 Daniels wanted to call Public Defender Isabel Day ("Day") to testify about
his incapacity on the night he was arrested.9 Day represented Daniels at the
4. Id. at 483-85.
5. Id. at 480.
6. Id. at 486 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(B)(2) (2000) (explaining the standard for issuing
a COA; part of AEDPA)). The Fourth Circuit in Daniels applied the appropriate standard in its
determination that a COA should not issue. Id. at 486-95; see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029,
1034 (2003) (holding that a petitioner must demonstrate a substantial showing of a denial of a
constitutional right before a COA may issue); Priya Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 407 (2003)
(analyzing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003)).
7. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 486. This case note will discuss four of the five points of error
Daniels raised. The fifth claim involved an error in the State's closing argument that the court
determined was procedurally defaulted. Id. The prosecutor used biblical quotations from the Old
Testament to urge the jury to sentence the defendant to death and the prosecutor suggested to the
jury that it was not ultimately responsible for a sentence of death. Id. at 487. The defendant did
not object to these statements at trial, the error was therefore not preserved and the claim was
procedurally defaulted. Id.




commitment proceeding which followed his early morning confession on January
18, 1990.10 However, because another public defender from Day's office was
one of Daniels's trial attorneys, the court would not permit her to testify."1
Daniels's trial attorney then attempted to withdraw so that Day could testify, but
the court refused his request." The Fourth Circuit considered whether these
claims amounted to a violation of the Sixth Amendment by applying the United
States Supreme Court's language in United States v. Valenuela-Bernal. 3 The Court
stated that a defendant "cannot establish a violation of his constitutional right to
a compulsory process merely by showing that [the court] deprived him of [the
excluded witness's] testimony. He must at least make some plausible showing
of how their testimony would have been both material and favorable to his
defense."' 4 In Daniels, the Fourth Circuit determined that other witnesses
testified to the defendant's mental state and incapacity on the night of his arrest.'"
Therefore, Day's testimony was only cumulative and its exclusion did not
constitute a violation of a constitutional right.'6
In the same vein, Daniels argued that he should have been allowed to
discharge the attorney who worked with Day.' The trial court's refusal to allow
this withdrawal, Daniels argued, violated his right to self-representation." The
Fourth Circuit found this argument to border on the ridiculous and countered
the defendant's claim with the fact that he never wanted to represent himself and
that even if the attorney in question did withdraw, Daniels still would have been
represented by his second attorney. 9
Daniels also claimed that his right to testify had been violated during his
sentencing proceeding. Both of Daniels's trial attorneys admitted that while
they did advise him of his right to testify during the guilt phase of the trial, they
could not recall advising him of his right to testify during the sentencing phase.
21
The court found that Daniels was present during two discussions of his ability
to testify at sentencing, once during voir dire and again when the trial court ruled





13. Daniels, 316 F.3d 488-89 (citing United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867
(1982) (explaining the standard applied to violations of compulsory process)).





19. Danies, 316 F.3d at 489-90.
20. Id. at 490.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 490-91.
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During this hearing, the trial court stated that should Daniels choose to testify,
the leg irons would not be displayed before the jury.23 Based on this evidence,
the court found that Daniels was aware of his right to testify, waived that right,
and, therefore, could not make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitu-
tional right.24
In conjunction with this claim, Daniels argued that his attorneys did not
provide effective assistance of counsel because they failed to explicitly inform
him of his right to testify.2" The Fourth Circuit determined that Daniels's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not pass the two-pronged test an-
nounced in Strickland v. Washington.26 In order for counsel to be considered
ineffective under Strickland, counsel must have made serious errors which
produced prejudice to the defendant.2 Daniels's trial attorneys were concerned
with him taking the stand during the guilt phase of the trial and convinced him
not to testify.2" During the sentencing phase, the attorneys made sure that
Daniels's mother took the stand to testify about his remorse.2 9 Based on this
evidence, the lower court determined that Daniels's attorneys made a tactical
decision and the Fourth Circuit concluded that there was no showing of a denial
of a constitutional right.3"
Next, Daniels raised two claims against his indictment.31 He argued that
North Carolina's short form indictment did not allege the necessary elements of
the murder offense and, therefore, was insufficient.32 The court gave short shrift
to this argument and cited the longstanding support for the short form murder
indictment in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hodgson v. Vermont3
which the Fourth Circuit recently reapplied in Hartman v. Lee.34 Further, Daniels
claimed that because the indictment failed to allege the aggravating factors
necessary for a jury to find for a sentence of death, the indictment was insuffi-
23. Id. at 491.
24. Id.
25. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 491.
26. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (defining the test for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim)).
27. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (stating that a Sixth Amendment violation requires that the
defendant "show that counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense").
28. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 491.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 491-92.
31. Id. at 492.
32. Id.
33. 168 U.S. 262 (1897).
34. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 493; seeHodgsonv. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262,270 (1897) (holding that
"it is sufficient to charge a statutory offense in the terms of the statute'); Hartman v. Lee, 283 F.3d
190, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding North Carolina's short-form murder indictment).
[Vol. 15:2
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cient under the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Ring v. Ai ona,35 Hams
v. United States,36 Apprendi v. New Jersy,37 and Jones v. United States.38 The Fourth
Circuit determined that this indictment claim did not amount to a substantial
showing of a denial of a constitutional right because the Ring line of cases was
not clearly established federal law at the time of Daniels's final conviction.
Finally, Daniels asserted that the prosecution knowingly offered false
testimony to the jury.' One witness for the prosecution, Dr. White, testified that
she interviewed some of Daniels's classmates, one of his supervisors when he
was in the Marines, and a former employer.4' She testified that she formed her
opinions regarding Daniels's capacity based on these interviews, a review of
Daniels's files, and her expertise.42 The defendant's false testimony claim centers
around two facts. First, Dr. White only interviewed one of the defendant's
classmates, but she told the jury she had interviewed "some."'43 Second, the
prosecutor sent Dr. White a note a day or two before she testified and instructed
her to interview certain individuals and to review certain documents.' When she
testified to the jury, Dr. White said that her opinions were based upon these
documents and interviews.45 The defendant tried to argue that Dr. White's
opinions must have been formed ahead of time and that she only cited these last
minute interviews to bolster her credibility; therefore, her testimony regarding the
basis of her opinions was false.'
35. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
36. 122 S. Ct. 2406 (2002).
37. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
38. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 492; see Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2430 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (clarifying that "[blecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the
functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires that they
be found by a jury"); Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 2413-16 (2002) (holding that a judge
can determine a sentencing factor that affects the mandatory minimum penalty without violating
constitutional rights, but cannot determine a sentencing factor which will affect a mandatory
maximum); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,476 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
protects a defendant from receiving a punishment that exceeds the maximum penalty he would
have received based on the facts found by the jury verdict alone);Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 243 n.6, 252 (1999) (finding that a carjacking statute that listed three acts with three different
penalties must be treated as three distinct offenses and each offense "must be charged in an
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt").
39. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 492-93; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to a state court decision can only be granted if the state court decision was
contrary to or was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; part of AEDPA).
40. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 493.
41. Id. at 493-94.
42. Id
43. Id. at 494.
44. Id.
45. Id
46. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 494.
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In order to resolve this claim the Fourth Circuit relied on Napue v. Ilinoif
which holds that the knowing use of false testimony could violate the defendant's
due process rights.48 Napue requires that a witness gave testimony which was
false, that the prosecutor knew the testimony was false, and that the testimony
was material.49 The fact that Dr. White testified that she interviewed "some" as
opposed to one classmate did not constitute a Napue claim because there was no
indication that the prosecutor was aware that this testimony was false. The court,
however, did not mention this point and focused instead on the materiality of the
statement.50 Dr. White corrected her statement regarding the number of class-
mates she interviewed while still on direct examination before the jury.5" In light
of this quick correction, the court determined that the original false statement did
not have a material effect on the judgment of the jury.52 Further, Dr. White's
testimony that her interviews informed her opinions was not necessarily false just
because the interviews took place right before the trial.5 3 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that neither of these incidents amounted to a violation of a constitu-
tional right.5 4
IV. Application in Virginia
The first point of interest that arises from Daniels surrounds the defendant's
right to testify. According to the Fourth Circuit, a defendant need not be
specifically informed of his right to testify during the sentencing proceeding. 5
A criminal defendant should be competent enough to infer this right from the
interactions his attorneys have with the court.5 6 This holding presumes that
criminal defendants are astute enough to make inferences regarding their rights
at trial and sentencing and do not need the benefit of explicit explanation or
guidance from counsel.
Defense counsel should also consider their professional relationships with
other attorneys who have interacted with the defendant before accepting an
appointment to a capital case. Day could well have been the most convincing
47. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
48. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 493 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (holding that
the prosecution violates a defendant's due process rights by knowingly using perjured testimony
to obtain a conviction)).
49. Id. (citing Basden v. Lee, 290 F.3d 602, 614 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that a "Naue claim
requires a showing of the falsity and materiality of testimony" and that "by knowingly offering or
failing to correct false testimony" the State violates the defendant's due process rights)).
50. Id. at 494.
51. Id. at 494-95.
52. Id. at 495.
53. Id. at 494.
54. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 495.
55. Id. at 490.
56. Id. at 490-91.
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witness to speak on Daniels's behalf regarding his condition on the night of his
arrest. Yet, the Fourth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision to bar her
testimony because she worked with one of Daniels's trial attorneys."7 Defense
counsel may need to check that a possible client has not had an evaluation,
commitment hearing, interview, or pre-trial hearing that involved a co-worker
before taking the case.
Daniels also clarified the Fourth Circuit's position on the application of Ring
to capital indictments. The court leaves open the question of whether capital
sentencing aggravators are now required in the indictment.5" However, the
Fourth Circuit clearly stated that Ring cannot be applied retroactively." This
decision affects all defendants whose date of final conviction precedes 2002. The
Fourth Circuit will not entertain insufficiencies in the indictment in pre-2002
final convictions for failure to allege the aggravating factors.'
The Fourth Circuit's decision regarding retroactivity is based exclusively on
the language of AEDPA.6" The court does not make an inquiry under Teague v.
Lane.6 2 However, sister circuits have responded differently to similar retroactivity
questions. In 1999, the United States Supreme Court held in Richardson v. United
States3 that when a jury convicts a defendant of committing a continuing series
of violations, it must unanimously agree on the specific violations."4 This deci-
sion provided a substantive interpretation of a statute-the underlying violations
are elements of the offense. Like Richardson, Ring also provided a substantive
interpretation of a statute--capital sentencing aggravators are elements of the
offense.
65
The Fourth Circuit has not ruled on whether Richardson should be applied
retroactively on collateral review. 66 Six other circuits have, however, concluded
57. Id. at 488-89.
58. Id. at 492.
59. Id. at 493.
60. See Daniels, 316 F.3d at 493 (stating that because Ring, HarrisJones, andApptrndwere not
established law in 1995, they cannot be used to invalidate Daniels's conviction or sentence).
61. Id.
62. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (holding that new criminalprocedure rules, that
are not based on prior precedent, do not apply to defendants who have received final judgments,
unless the rule falls within two narrow exceptions); see Horn v. Banks, 122 S. Ct. 2147, 2150 (2002)
(affirming that a threshold question in every habeas case, is whether the court must apply the Teague
rule to the defendant's claim); Janice L. Kopec, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 133 (2002) (analyzing
Horn v. Banks, 122 S. Ct. 2147 (2002)).
63. 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
64. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 815 (1999) (holding that a jury must unani-
mously find the specific violations underlying a conviction of committing a continuing series of
violations).
65. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2430.
66. Little v. United States, 184 F. Supp. 2d 489, 496 (E.D. Va. 2002) (stating that because
neither the Fourth Circuit, nor the United States Supreme Court, has ruled on retroactive applica-
tion of Richardson, it might be retroactively applicable on collateral review).
2003]
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that Teague does not bar retroactive application of Richardson.67 The reason for
this conclusion is that Ricbardson is considered a substantive rule, and Teague does
not bar retroactive application of substantive rules.68 Courts have also ruled that
Teague does bar retroactive application of Apprendi, essentially because Apprendi
contains a procedural rule.69 These decisions are informative for two reasons.
First, other circuits are applying a Teague analysis to Richardson and Apprendi; they
are not confining their rulings to the language of AEDPA. Second, the portion
of Ring which re-defines the aggravators is more like Richardson than Apprendi.
The holding of Ring has two components-one procedural and one sub-
stantive. The procedural component of Ring echoes Apprendi in that it requires
the jury, not the judge to make factual findings during the sentencing phase.
7 °
The part of the Arizona statute which allocated this power to the judge is uncon-
stitutional.7' This portion of Ring is no doubt procedural and, like Apprendi,
would be barred from retroactive application under Teague.72
In the same breath, the Court in Ring also stated that "Arizona's enumerated
aggravating factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense.' ""7 Even though this language stems from Apprendi, it is sub-
stantively applied to Arizona's statutory aggravators. Ring requires that a sentenc-
ing jury agree unanimously on an aggravator. This interpretation is substantive
and identical to the one at work in Richardson:
If the statute creates a single element, a "series," in respect to which
individual violations are but the means, then the jury need only agree
that the defendant committed at least three of all the underlying crimes
the Government has tried to prove. The jury need not aree about
which three. On the other hand, if the statute makes each 'violation"
67. See United States v. Barajas-Diaz, 313 F.3d 1242, 1245 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that
Teague does not bar retroactive application of Ri'bardson because Richardson is a substantive rule);
Ross v. United States, 289 F.3d 677,681 (11th Cir. 2002) (supporting the same proposition); United
States v. Lopez, 248 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001) (supporting the same proposition); Santana-
Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2001) (supporting the same proposition);
Lanier v. United States, 220 F.3d 833, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2000) (supporting the same proposition);
Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 906 (6th Cir. 2000) (supporting the same proposition). -
68. Barajas-Dia., 313 F.3d at 1245.
69. United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the new rule
in Apprendi is procedural, not substantive, and under Teague would be barred from retroactive
application on collateral review). Brown cites seven other circuits which applied the Teague analysis
to Apprendi and held that it was not retroactive on collateral review. Id. at 308-09 (citations
omitted).
70. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443.
71. Id. at 2442-43.
72. For an interesting discussion supporting the proposition thatApprendi should be granted
retroactive status under Teague see People v. Beachem, No. 1-99-0852, 2002 WL 31875456, at *1,
*3-*8 (Ill. App. Dec. 24, 2002) (unpublished opinion).
73. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
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a separate element, then the jury must agree unanimously about which
three crimes the defendant committed.1
Like Richardson's "violations," Ring makes every aggravator a separate element
which the jury must unanimously agree upon. This portion of Ring is a substan-
tive interpretation of the role of aggravators in the statute; similar to Richardson,
they have been re-defined. Substantive statutory interpretations that result in
new rules are not barred from retroactive application under Teague.
Based on Ring, Daniels claimed that his indictment was insufficient because
it failed to allege the sentencing aggravators.7" This challenge relied solely on the
substantive portion of the Ring holding. The procedural portion which shifted
power from judge to jury is not at issue. Because challenges to indictments only
touch on the substantive portions of Ring, they should be granted retroactive
application in accordance with the treatment Richardson has received.
V. Conclusion
In each issue which arose in Daniels, the Fourth Circuit contemplated the
merits of the arguments and determined that the defendant did not make a
substantial showing of a violation of a constitutional right. These decisions
reflect the great deference paid to lower court decisions under the AEDPA
standards. The Fourth Circuit punctuated its reluctance to challenge the lower
court's decisions by using AEDPA to bar retroactive application of the Ring line
of cases.76
Janice L. Kopec
74. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 818.
75. Daniels, 316 F.3d at 492-93.
76. Id. at 493.

